NUNCA MAIS PROPOSAL FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT

INTRODUCTION

The strategic geographical situation of our country turns Galician coast into a compulsory passage for a dense maritime commercial traffic. According to official data, each year 45,000 trading ships overpass the Maritime Traffic Separation Device of Fisterra (Dispositivo de Separación do Tránsito Marítimo de Fisterra), that is 122 ships diary. From those, about 13,000 transport dangerous cargoes, that is, 36 ships per day. If we sum up this quantity to the amount of Galician fishing boats that work generally in their traditional fishing routes, that sometimes coincide with the route of the known as “Fisterra way” (Corredor de Fisterra), we will have an idea of the real dimension of a problem we have at a little distance.

The real number of accidents is much higher than what is made public in the media. It is not just known disasters as “Aegean Sea”, “Casón”, “Urquiola”, etc. In the last two years, for example, more ships had run aground or had some accident in Galician seas: “Kristal”, “Kabou”, “Ramdane Abane” (this was on the verge to cause a real human and ecologic catastrophe in the coast of Muxía), “Alexander I”, “MSC Pride”, and a long etcetera. There was also the “Pacific Pintail”, which travelled all over Galician coast loaded with 230kg of uranium. According to this, we can state that Galicia suffers the highest maritime accident rate of all Europe, as well as an incompetent matrix of governors. It also suffers from discrimination in this matter as well as from a high lack of protection and helplessness in this field.

The “Prestige” accident, despite the official version, is an obvious example to show this helplessness that Galicia is still suffering on 2002. It shows the lack of protection of the Galician Coastal line, the lack of preventive resources, maritime traffic control, security devices and maritime rescue devices. It is useless to set a sound media campaign, supported by political powers, to blame exclusively the captain of the ship, as well as the Rock of Gibraltar for what happened, in order to exonerate the Xunta de Galicia (the Galician regional government) and Spanish government of any political direct responsibilities in this catastrophe, whose consequences and proportions are still impossible to calculate.

The Spanish government and the Xunta de Galicia, consciously and deliberately hid information, censored, manipulated and lied to Galician society since this “Prestige” dramatic episode started on the 13th November in front Galician coast.

The maritime rescue ships belonging to the Xunta de Galicia (the towing boat “Valdivia” and the supporting ship “Serra de Santiago”) could not operate due to their obsoleteness and their technical incapability for this kind of actions. Helicopter “Pesca I” and “Pesca II” showed to be inefficient, small, with little autonomous capacity and without any capacity of acting in case of tempest. According to this, all the Xunta devices were out of order. All these are the total amount of facilities and devices that the Xunta de Galicia has to protect the Galician coastal line, which has 1,200 km, 19 rías (bays), 127 harbours, in climate hard climate conditions, as there is a rate of 109 days per year with average wind intensity Force 8, that is, tempest. 

Spanish Government facilities and devices: It is true that the “Helimer Galicia” helicopter, with higher resources than Galician helicopters “Pesca”, had more aerial control over the situation, but it had not any real intervention capacity on the accident.

The towing boats issue is a little more complicated. It is alarming enough that the powerful boat “Alonso de Chaves” was reallocated in Xixón, leaving its original harbour in A Coruña, due to a direct political- and whimsical, not objective-decision from Madrid. But besides this, these ships belong to private companies and they establish contracts in order to give service to the public administration in case of taking part in rescue actions.  In any case, they follow the logics of private companies, that is, to get the highest income with the lowest expense, leaving social objectives at the end of the queue.

It was especially serious the role of the towing boat “Ria de Vigo”, which belongs to the State Society for Maritime Rescue (SASEMAR), and consequently, to the Spanish Ministry of Public Works and the Economy, but under the ruling of the private company REMOLCANOSA. This ship was the first one that arrived near the “Prestige” during the first hours of the accident. It held negotiations with companies “Smit Salvage” and “Universe Maritime Ltd.” in order to establish the economic cost of the rescue, without acting in any way until an agreement was reached.

The international agreement known as Paris Memorandum, signed, among others, by Spain, situates ships that hoist Spanish flag under countries like South Korea, Liberia, Barbados or Singapore, according to the number of inspections and the defects detected in the ships. This situation gave way to the officers of Maritime Captainships to denounce the reality they have to face in this matter.

About half of the ships that stop at Galician harbours are not submitted to prescribed administrative and maritime security controls. The most absurd thing is that these common practices are not outside the prevailing norms, but are made according to them, through the system known as “self-management” (autodespacho).

So, a ship can get a permission to leave the harbour, before of after having stopped, if it arrives outside working hours. In this peculiar way, a ship transporting dangerous cargo has just to make coincide the time of arrival with the non working hours to avoid the inspection. Community inspectors work from Monday to Friday, what gives many opportunities to many ships to program the time of arrival to the harbour.

This happened again at the harbour of A Coruña with another oil tanker, after the “Prestige” catastrophe.

With regards to preventive policies, it is unbelievable that there is no radar coverage all over our coastal line, neither in parts of the Galician sea with radio-electric shadow, where 16 VHF channel, the S.O.S. frequency used by ships in case of an emergency, can not be used. Besides, it is necessary to say that there is no via satellite maritime traffic tracking, as it is being done since many years ago in other countries.

It was also noticeable the lack of specialised devices for the treatment of marine pollution. Few weak barriers, lack of specialised ships, lack of personnel, the non-set up of the Contingency Plan designed for emergency situations…on the whole, a global set of lack of precaution, incompetence, politic submission, lies and informative manipulation.

From the EU it is being fostered a transport policy that pretends revitalise alternative to road transport modes of transport, in order to reach an equilibrium by the year 2010 (White book on transport) [1] .

In the new context of sustainable development, and due too to economic reasons, it is being considered the need of emphasizing a public and quality transport through the fostering of train, river and maritime modes of transport.

Currently, 70% of European trade exchanges are made by maritime way, specially 90% of oil trade and its derivatives.

Nevertheless, European fleet has been reduced in favour of Convenience flags, and the number of European merchant navy professionals has diminished 40% since 1980. On the other hand, member states of the EU, as Portugal, Italy and Spain appeared in the grey list of the 2001 Annual Report of the Paris Agreement on the Harbour Control Memorandum (Paris- MOU). This intermediate qualification refers to the ships risk-level, and the lower risk would be represented as white.

Harbours are embedded in a competitive run for the maritime traffic and the infrastructural investments of the EU, what favours paying less attention to security and environment. It is much easy to compete by avoiding internalising expenses on security and environment, and this is how conditions for the appearance of Convenience harbours are created.

In fact, nowadays there is the paradox of the enlargement of harbours with Communitarian funds, although they do not have prevention and security devices, or emergency plans that could face a possible risk related to their activity and traffic.

Galicia, with over 1,500 coastal km, represents 32,6% of the Spanish coastal line and 4,28% of the Communitarian coastal line. In front of Galician coast it flows 10% of international traffic and 70% of oil trade with the EU. Numerous and serious maritime accidents that have happened in Galician coastline all over the years, give us an idea of the situation of insecurity and abandonment we are facing nowadays.

It is also important to note that, according with maritime accidents statistics of the “General Office of Spanish Merchant Marine” (Dirección General de la Marina Mercante Española), in the year 2000 there was a total amount of 568 accidents registered, and Galicia is on the top of all the regions with 113 accidents. This table also gives some figures related to the causes of the accidents:

It is necessary to note that 35 % of the accidents are due to unknown causes, what shows the poor security conditions that exist nowadays, as well as the low interest in investigating these causes. It is noticeable too the high rate of accidents due to human failure and to bad weather. With there figures, which are public and historically known, it is more that evident that it is urgent to reinforce the current maritime traffic security policies.

TABLE:

CAUSE

Nº accidents

%

     

Bad weather

56

9.9

Material failure

75

13.2

Human failure

238

41.9

Unknown

199

35.0

     

Total

568

100

1. PREVENTION MEASURES

1.1.  International Cooperation

International cooperation within the framework of an specific agreement of mutual assistance for EU Member States is needed in order to improve, on the basis of our experience, the International Agreements regarding regional assistance, i.e. the Bonn and Copenhagen agreements. This mutual assistance should prioritise fast intervention and the use of specialized and adequate tools. The EU should sign international agreements for mutual cooperation with third countries.

In our opinion, the EU should promote, in the framework of the IMO,  tighter international regulations in the area of  Environmental and Maritime Security.

The EU should, in our view, advocate, within the framework of the IMO, the protection of specially sensitive areas (because of their environmental and commercial resources) against shipping; we propose the inclusion of Galicia as one of those special areas.

The International Civil Responsibility Convention must be modified, in order to include  the financial burdens derived from casualties resulting in the contamination of the environment. The EU Member States must support the IMO initiatives leading to substantial improvements of the financial contributions and instruments allowing for the introduction of all these measures.

It is a pressing priority to revise the current regulations regarding the separation of the maritime traffic from Fisterra, moving it beyond the 21.5 miles; also, to expand North-South the area under control; and to provide it with all the necessary technical, human and financial instruments allowing for an effective control of shipping activities off the Galician Coasts.

1.2. Maritime Safety

1.2.1. Flags of Convenience (FOCs)

A great deal of Europe´s commercial fleet is now under Flags of Convenience, as a result of  EU policies that encouraged and funded the use of FOCs. After a period of permissiveness and as a result of the social alarm emerging from the Erika casualty, changes in EU guidelines in the area of maritime safety were introduced [2] .

In our view, the Directive [3] in force regarding the activities of Classification Societies is positive, but insufficient if we truly intend to tackle the problem of maritime safety as a result of the use of FOCs.

An active policy including political and financial pressures to shape the commercial relations with third countries is needed, so that control measures and regular inspections are put in place for vessels flying their flags. In this manner the flags of those states should not be included on the Paris MOU blacklist. At present, countries such as Turkey and Morocco have been regarded as ‘very-high-risk’ nations by Paris MOU, while they maintain a preferential relationship with the EU. The case of Turkey is particularly remarkable, given its present status as a candidate country for the EU and the size of its fleet, along with its significant activities in EU waters. In fact, 39.39% of all the vessels in the blacklist, published in accordance with the standards of Directive 95/21/EC, modified by Directive 2001/106/EC, on control of Harbours State, which is due to be enforced on July, 22, 2003, fly the Turkish flag.

Within the EU there are many ship owners flying foreign flags in order to avoid the safety and control regulations of Member States. In this regard, a line of action to provide financial support for those ship owners flying EU flags should be implemented. State support for shipping activities (improvement of equipments, scraping, etc.) should be limited to those abandoning the use of FOCs [4] .

The English Channel Islands (UK), Feroe Islands (Denmark), Madeira (Portugal) and the Canary Islands (Spain) have a special status allowing for the use of FOCs. Portugal, Italy, Spain, Feroe Islands and Gibraltar are on the grey list of the Paris MOU Annual Report 2001.

Often FOCs are associated to fiscal havens where it is difficult to claim civil and criminal liability resulting from accidental or deliberate contamination caused by vessels. It is, therefore, necessary to put forward international initiatives to put an end to the prevailing permissiveness, behind which there are strong economic interests. Also, EU initiatives are needed to bring pressure to bear on those European corporations that find shelter in fiscal havens and FOCs.

1.2.  Harbours of Convenience

Competition among harbours to attract shipping activities is leading in some cases to deficits in safety and environmental protection levels; in order to achieve more competitive rates, expenditure in these important areas for the general interest is cut down. Other problems found are: political control on the part of the maritime authorities in charge of Control Inspections of vessels, loosening of inspections, reduction of inspections efforts for specific corporations with greater political and economic weight for that harbour, absence of inspections over the weekends for boats in ballast or for bunkering activities.

It is necessary to increase transparency and citizens´ control on harbour activities, and avoiding the isolation from any sort of democratic control by the competent institutions.

The UE should develop lines of action to ensure that [5] :

  1. Maritime authorities are professionals working independently from authorities and government
  2. The number of inspectors is proportional to the shipping activities
  3. It is compusory to carry out inspections in non working days for vessels in ballast or in bunkering operations
  4. Special allowances are available for those harbours with the greater percentages of inspections while those below the limits required are penalized
  5. The minimum percentage required must be increased to 40% [6] and must be assessed with respect to each harbour, not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively depending on the specfic features of harbour movements
  6. There is a transparent control of maritime traffic. The list of harbour movements should be published, with specific reference to the vessel´s name, IMO, flag, year the ship was built, type of vessel, type of hull, cargo, inspections and results.
  7. There is an increase in harbour control activities by democratic institutions

1.2.3. European Maritime Safety Agency [7]

We welcome the setting up of this institution. But it is necessary to facilitate its operations and to provide it with all the financial, technical and human resources required for the development of its activities regarding maritime safety.

On the basis of our respect for other proposals, we believe that the tragic record of casualties off our coasts [8] are a clear indication of the lack of protection and even abandonment we are subject to. Therefore, this is an argument in favor of our initiative to propose Galicia to host the European Maritime Safety Agency.

1.2.4. Double-hull tankers [9]

After the serious casualties of the Erika and Prestige tankers, the Galician and European public opinions are worried about the obstacles that the EU is finding in imposing the use of double-hulls.

The rate of  progressive substitution of old vessels –agreed upon by the IMO- is clearly insufficient.

USA´s unilateral measures allowing exclusively double-hull vessels to enter their harbours appear to be useful.

Owners and charterers are ready to accept that no vessel older than 15 years transporting oil derivatives should be allowed into EU harbours [10] . Also, the number  of double-hull vessels at the end of 2002 was 1,415 (41%) and will presumably be 75% by 2007 [11] .

It is therefore viable to:

-         Advance the prohibition of single-hull tankers into EU waters by 2005.

-         Ban access of single-hulled vessels loaded with any type of fuel-oil or heavy oil derivatives to EU harbours, terminals and anchorage areas

-         Ban access of vessels over 15 years of age transporting hazardous or contaminating substances to EU harbours, terminals and anchorage areas, regardless of their flag

1.2.5. Shelters [12]

The will of the Commission to establish shelters for troubled vessels is a positive development. However, it is a pressing need to start the construction of appropriate shelters on our coasts in the framework of the protocols of action established in Contingency Plans, along with the provision of financial, technical and human resources for these shelters.

1.2.6. EU Structural Funds and Safety

There is a European policy for the promotion of maritime lines (sea motorways) between European harbours with intermodal links, using the Structural Funds to promote this use and to secure an attractive commercial dimension.

If we truly intend to encourage Sustainable Development, investments in infrastructures resulting from EU transport policy cannot be separated from specific assurances of safety and environmental protection.

EU regulations must be drafted in order to establish minimum levels that harbour facilities must comply with, depending on the specific nature of each different area, the volume of movements, prevention measures, protection instruments and contingency plans.

Nunca Mais believes that explicit regulations must be introduced establishing that EU investments in infrastructures must always meet all the environmental and safety rules. Strict EU inspections should be carried out in order to guarantee that prevention, protection and contingency plans are in place to confront all the risks derived from their specific nature and of the transiting of hazardous substances. EU inspectors should hear all those involved.

A Financial Fund must be set up to provide all the financial, technical and human resources needed for a public system of Traffic Control and Martitime Safety and for the struggle angainst marine contamination (tug-boats, salvage and anti-contamination boats, special aircraft, floating barriers, skimmers, etc.)

1.2.7. Environmental Safety

Sustainable development is not possible if we give priority to financial interests over safety and the environment.

Coastal areas have always been particularly active and have a strong demographic pressure and heightened economic activities. Consequently, in order for Sustainable Development to be a reality it is urgent to provide a legal shape to EU directives on the Comprehensive Development of Coastal Areas. Sustainable Development is not an option if we do not define those uses that are compatible with the environment and with environmental safety.

1.2.8. Penal Sanctions [13]

We support an initiative to put forward a Directive including sanctions -even penal ones- to prosecute contamination caused by tankers.

We recommend the introduction of sanctions for any kind of accident and also for those emerging as a result of activities in harbour facilities. Liability for authorities resulting from negligent decisions or for lacking the instruments for prevention, protection and contingency plans should be included.

1.2.9. Professional Training for Sea Workers [14]

We support the introduction of a Directive to secure a mimimum level of training for sea workers.

2.- MEANS OF PROTECTION

Casualties take place as a consequence of many different reasons, including human actions, meteorological phenomena and unknown causes, which account for 60% of risky casualties. Due to this fact, preventive measures are necessary in order to decrease the amount of casualties and the impact they have on the environment, but preventive measures cannot guarantee security. That is the reason why appropriate means of protection are so important.

Galiza does not have storage centres, enough physical means or specialised staff, in spite of its marine tradition and the great number of casualties that have taken place on its coasts.

2.1.-  Establishment of storage and emergency centres.

The storage and emergency centres should be located at different places on the coast, following technical criteria. They should carry out hazard analyses and be able to intervene rapidly. Moreover, they should have appropriate equipment and staff to solve assessed hazards. Norway has 15 centres of this kind and France has 13 storage centres.

2.2.-  Physical means

Physical means should adjust to the hazards they try to solve and be located at the most suitable place for a rapid intervention.

Examples of necessary physical means are:

Vessels devoted to the control of oil spill pollution.

Power-ranged tugboats.

Coastguard vessels equipped to fight against hydrocarbons.

Seagoing and coastal barges.

Equipped monitoring aircrafts.

Satellite monitoring.

Floating barriers of different technical properties (ocean barriers, coastal barriers, etc.).

Adsorption barriers.

Power-ranged land  and water skimmers suitable to remove fluids of different densities.

Towtracks.

Inflatable tanks. Different-sized bins adapted to the different types of cleaning-up works.

Filter masks with I.P.E. (Individual Protective Equipment).

Special equipment for divers.

Suction pump to clean up the seabeds.   

Lighting equipments suitable for different types of cleaning-up works.

Signaling beacon.

Technical equipments to clean up the beaches, etc. 

2.3.- Technical staff.

Specialised and trained staff is required.

3.- EMERGENCY PLAN.

Once hazards are assessed, appropriate physical, technical and human means are required. Besides, it is necessary to plan an intervention strategy in order to determine the way of reacting in case the potential hazards become real. For such purpose, an operating plan of protection must be established.

An Emergency Plan is an operating plan of protection that consists of a number of key elements, where different performance protocols for different risk levels and contingencies are envisaged. It should also include other activities, such as information for the affected people, drills, etc.

When the Prestige accident took place, Galiza did not have an Emergency Plan.

4.- OTHER MEASURES

4.1.- Compensantions.

We support the proposal submitted by the Commission to the IMO aiming at increasing to €1000 million the line from which the shipowner loses the right to limit his liability.

Regardless of whether the IMO approves the proposal or not, we believe that the Compensation fund for oil pollution damage in European waters ("the COPE Fund") [15] , proposed by the Commission, should be extended to €1500 million and should be ratified by all the member states.

4.2.- EU Solidarity Fund [16] .

We support the modification of the EUSF that makes it cover technological and environmental catastrophes, apart from natural catastrophes.

Given the seriousness of the Prestige casualty and its environmental consequences and as a sign of solidarity with the affected people , we believe that it should be retrospectively applied for this case.

4.3.-  Financial aid for shellfishermen, fish-farmers, sailors and for all the workers of related activites.

At the Plataforma Nunca Máis, we are aware of the difficult situation of this country following the national and regional government's attempt to pretend that everything is under control, thus downplaying the mid and long-term impact of the black tide on the environment, the fisheries sector and the citizens.

We propose to maintain financial support for stakeholder sectors and to extend it to other sectors affected, such as the tourist industry, catering, water-treatment plants, canning industry, etc.

4.4.- Establishment of an Environmental Recovery Centre.

Once the marine environment is cleaned, it is necessary to carry out recovery activities in order to restore the environmental damage and to reestablish the commercial activity in the area.

We believe that the national and regional governments do not undertake their responsibility regarding this aspect.

The UE should also establish an Environmental Recovery Fund to carry out such activities and monitor its real implementation.

4.5.- Establishment of a European Follow-up Commission.

We do not trust our governments' performance regarding cleaning-up and recovery activities. For this reason, we propose to establish a European Follow-up Commission that collects information from the stakeholder sectors and assesses the level of pollution and the cleaning-up and recovery activities.

4.6.- Establishment of an Investigation Commission.

We would like to let the EU know that our society is worried and alarmed, since such a serious event, which is also affecting other member states, is not being investigated at a European level. We regard reliable information and transparence as pillars of democratic institutions and we cannot stay on the sidelines while the mechanisms which allow us to have our own institutions are going to pot.

That is why we request the establishment of an Investigation Commission.

Galiza, 24 March 2003.

Translated by TsF Prestige.



[1] COM (2001) 370

[2] Pack of measures Erika-1 and Erika-2.

[3] Directive 94/57/CE of the council of 22 November 1994, modified by Directive 2001/105/CE of the European Parliament and the Council , 19th December, 2001,  on rules and common standards for the ship inspection organizations, as well as for the activities related to maritime administrations.

[4] DOCE C 205/1997; COM (1993) 66.

[5]   Directive 95/21/CE of the council of 19th June 1995, on Harbour state control, modified by Directive 2001/106/CE of the Parliament and the Council,19th December, 2001.

[6] According to the Annual Report of the Paris Agreement on Harbour Controul Memorandum, on the year 2001, the EU average on inspection was of 27, 02%. Directive 95/21/CE, modified by Directive 2001/105/CE, establishes a minimum of 25 % and it does not mean an advence for the whole of the EU.

[7]   Regulation (CE) Nº 1406/2002 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27th June, 2002, thatconstitutes the European Agency for Maritime Security.

[8] Oil Tanker Poycommander, filled with 50,000 tones of oil ran aground Cies Islands in the Ria of Vigo (04/05/70), trading ship Erkowit, filled with two million drums of toxic material, in the ría of A Coruña (31-10-70). Oil tanker Urquiola runs aground in the ría of A Coruña filled with 100.000 Tones of oil (12-05-76). Oil TannkerAndros Patria sinks in Galician seas with 200.000 tons of oil (31-12-78). Tradng ship Cason runs aground in Fisterra with two thousand drums of chemical products (05-12-87). Oil Tanker Aegean Sea runs aground in the ría of A Coruña filled with 80,000 tones of oil (03-12-92).

[9] Proposal of regulation refered on the 20th December, 2002,by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.

[10] COM (2002) 681. Page.6.

[11] Intertanko web site.

[12] Directive 2002/59/CE, of the European Parliament and the Council, of 27th  June, 2002, related to the establishment of a acommunitarian tracking system an dinformation on maritime traffic.

[13] Proposal of Directive of the European Parliament and the Council about pollution coming from ships and introduction of sanctions, even penal sanctions for pollution crimes. COM (2003) 92.

[14] Proposal of  Directive of the European Parliament and the Council that modifies the Directive 2001/25/CE, related to minimum preparation standards in maritime proffessions. COM (2003) 1.

[15] COM (2000) 802.

[16] Regulamento (CE) nº 2012/2002 of the council, of 11 de november, 2002, that creates the EU Solidarity Fund.